Housing Finance in Sudan

Overview

In 2021, Sudan’s estimated population was approximately 44.9 million, of which 49.1% (22.43 million) were male. An estimated 57% (25.5 million) of the population is working-age (15-64 years), and approximately 4% (1.6 million) older (65 years or more).[1] While the annual population growth rate has slightly declined over the past decade[2]  – from 3.8% in 1990 to 2.4% in 2021 – the urban population has been growing. It grew at an annual rate of 3.3% in 2021.[3] Approximately 36% (15.6 million) of the population live in urban areas.[4] More than a third (37%) or six million of this urban population resides in the country’s largest city, Khartoum. The rural population constitutes 28.9 million.[5] Although most people live in rural areas, rural-urban migration is increasing[6] because of land shortages, poor amenities, conflict, and declining agricultural production. Despite the growing urban population, the construction of social, low-cost, and investment housing has remained low,[7] leading to a housing supply shortage of 2.5 million units.[8] At least 88% of Sudan’s urban population lives in slums and informal settlements.[9]

Sudan’s economy is sustained primarily by agriculture and mineral-fuel extraction. Sudan’s economic growth has been stunted with a -3.6% drop in the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, improving to 0.5% in 2021.[10] Monetary policies by the Central Bank of Sudan designed to boost economic growth have achieved limited success since the CPI-based inflation peaked at 382.8% in 2021 when fuel subsidies were removed as the currency fell.[11] Other aggravating factors include the pandemic, political instability, and the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Inflation is expected to fall to 115% through 2023 as these challenges ease. However, political unrest resulting from the October–November 2021 coup d’état has also slowed economic growth. The military takeover was conducted by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who assumed control of the government and detained many leaders.[12] The resulting chaos left scores of civilians and law officers dead. Massive economic losses followed, with exports decreasing more than 85% as of January 2022.[13] As an oil-exporting nation, COVID-19 dealt a macroeconomic blow to Sudan, as crude oil prices plummeted to unprecedented levels.[14] Oil income is the largest source of government revenue, accounting for 7.92% of total exports as of 2017.[15] Despite these problems, the AfDB expected growth to bounce back to 5.3% in 2021/22 and 6.5% in 2022/23 as economic activity increases with the elimination of travel restrictions associated with COVID-19.

Sudan struggles with land degradation, sustained temperature increases, devastating droughts and floods, and locust incursions that reduce farm production, hamper development, and disrupt household incomes. Subsistence farmers lose approximately 20% of harvests to adverse weather events, coupled with the loss of human and land resources. In August 2022, flash floods destroyed over 5 000ha of agricultural land and 47 400 houses in Gedaref, Darfur, Kassala, White Nile, and Sennar.[16] Sudan ranked 177^th out of 182 nations in climate flexibility and adaptation in the 2020 Country Index of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative.[17]

[1] World Bank (2021). Population, total – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SD (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[2] World Bank (2021). Population growth (annual %) – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=SD (Accessed 24 August 2022).

[3] Ibid.

[4] World Bank (2021). Urban population (% of total population) – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=SD (Accessed 24 August 2022).

[5] World Bank (2022). Population in largest city – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/%20EN.URB.LCTY%20?locations=SD (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[6] World Bank (2022). Urban population growth (annual %) – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.GROW?locations=SD (Accessed 24 August 2022).

[7] Franck, A. (2020). Three decades of social housing policies in Khartoum: Between violence, clientelism, and social consensus. Politique Africaine, 158, 149-174. https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POLAF_158_0149–three-decades-of-social-housing-policies.htm (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 20.

[8] Dongola, M. (2019). Presentation: ‘State of the Housing Industry – Sudan.’ Sudan Contractors Association.  https://www.internationalhousingassociation.org/fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=3&contentID=266313&subContentID=721497&channelID=38488 (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pgs. 8-14

[10] AfDB (2022). African Economic Outlook 2022. 25 May 2022. Sudan. https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-economic-outlook-2022 (Accessed 31 August 2022). Pg. 151

[11] World Bank. (2021). Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=SD (Accessed 10 September 2022).

[12] ReliefWeb. (2021). Sudan: Coup d’état and civil unrest, Flash Update No: 2 (29 October 2021) [EN/AR]. https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-coup-d-tat-and-civil-unrest-flash-update-no-2-29-october-2021-enar (Accessed 10 September 2022).

[13] Abdelaziz, K., Eltahir, N. and Lewis, A. (2022). Sudan’s economy tumbles in post-coup deadlock. 2 March 2022. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-economy-tumbles-post-coup-deadlock-2022-03-02/ (Accessed 12 September 2022).

[14] U.N. Sustainable Development Group (2020). Policy Brief: Impact of COVID-19 in Africa. May 2020. https://unsdg.un.org/resources/policy-brief-impact-covid-19-africa (Accessed 22 August 2022). Pg. 16.

[15] Ali, S., Murshed, S.M. and Papyrakis, E. (2022). Oil, export diversification and economic growth in Sudan: evidence from a VAR model. 21 March 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13563-022-00310-w (Accessed 7 September 2022). Pg. 2.

[16] ReliefWeb. (2022). Sudan: Weekly Floods Round-up, No. 04 (28 August 2022). https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-weekly-floods-round-no-04-28-august-2022 (Accessed 7 September 2022).

[17] Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. (2022). Rankings. https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/ (Accessed 21 August 2022).

Access to Finance

Sudan is home to 35 operating banks concentrated in Khartoum,[1] including five foreign and four state-owned banks.[2] Most foreign banks originate from Gulf nations like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Banks dominate the financial industry and account for over 80% of its overall assets.[3] The Bank of Khartoum is the leading bank, with over 150 outlets and cash offices across the country and a portfolio exceeding S£913 billion ($2 billion).[4] All banks are controlled by the Central Bank of Sudan following the 1970 Nationalisation of Banks Act. The Central Bank and the government either fully or partially own 41% of these banks through multiple capital injections over time to restabilise failing banks.[5] In 1974, the government instituted an open-door policy to encourage foreign banks to establish operations in Sudan. Key players in the industry, like the Faisal Islamic Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, took advantage of such investor-friendly laws to enter the Sudan market.

Islamic banking (Shari’ah) principles have governed the finance industry since the Islamic Legal Revolution in the 1980s.[6] Financial access is weak: only 15% of Sudan’s population have registered bank accounts.[7] The unavailability of banking services is a major aggravating factor. Sudan had only 3.4 commercial bank branches per 100 000 adults in 2018 compared to 4.7 in Kenya[8] and 9.2 in South Africa.[9] However, promising trends in internet usage could increase financial access. As of 2020, 28% of the population constituted active internet users, which translates to approximately 12.5 million individuals. Mobile internet users opt for online banking services based on ease of use, quality of service, and convenience.[10] The banking sector has yet to fully optimise these modern technologies, including e-banking.[11]

Constrained access to banking services has increased reliance on non-bank alternatives. Most Sudanese seeking formal housing rely on cash and diaspora remittances from family members. The annual diaspora remittances to Sudan average S£1.369 trillion ($3 billion).[12] Residents also seek funds from white-collar jobs, but this is complicated by a high unemployment rate, which currently stands at 19.8%.[13] Unemployment disproportionately affects women, as female unemployment is double (30.7%) the male unemployment rate (14.6%).[14]

The rate of non-performing loans in microfinance institutions was 7.7% in 2017 but decreased to 4% in 2018.[15] The improvement is associated with better credit supply, market confidence, and economic growth. However, the lending interest rate and minimum mortgage rate were high at 12%.[16]

[1] Central Bank of Sudan. Operating Banks in Sudan. https://cbos.gov.sd/en/content/operating-banks-sudan (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[2] International Trade Administration (2022). Sudan – Trade Financing. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-trade-financing 30 July 2022. (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[3] African Development Bank Group (2022). Sudan Economic Outlook: Recent macroeconomic and financial developments. https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan/sudan-economic-outlook (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[4] Bank of Khartoum. Our History. https://bankofkhartoum.com/sudan/our-history/  (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[5] Burger, J. (2018). The financial services sector in Sudan. 14 May 2018. How we made it in Africa. https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/the-financial-services-sector-in-sudan/61452(Accessed: 23 August 2022).

[6] Mustafa, O.A.O. (2021). History of Banking in Sudan (Conventional and Islamic): A Critical Review (1903-2019). International Finance and Banking, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.5296/ifb.v8i1.18740 (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 29.

[7] International Finance Corporation (2020). Building Resilience Through Digital Financial Services. Africa COVID-19 Digital Finance Market Impact Series. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/5cf2c980-e37e-46ce-8af5-0e81af74e3ee/Sudan-building-resilience-through-DFS.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=nOTJU2b (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 1.

[8] The World Bank (2020). Commercial bank branches (per 100 000 adults) – Kenya. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5?locations=KE (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[9]Ibid.).

[10] Mansour, I.H.F., Eljelly, A.M.A. and Abdullah, A.M.A. (2016). Consumers’ attitude towards e-banking services in Islamic banks: the case of Sudan. Review of International Business and Strategy, 26(2). https://doi.org/10.1108/RIBS-02-2014-0024 (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 244.

[11] International Trade Administration. (2022). Sudan – Trade Financing. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-trade-financing (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[12] UNDP (2020). The Potential of Sudanese Diaspora Remittances. https://www.undp.org/arab-states/publications/potential-sudanese-diaspora-remittances (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[13] World Bank (2021). Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[14] Ibid.

[15] Central Bank of Sudan (2018). 68^th Annual Report 2018. https://cbos.gov.sd/sites/default/files/CBOS%20-%2058th%20Annual%20Report%202018.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2022). Pg. 37.

[16] Dongola, M. (2019). Presentation: ‘State of the Housing Industry – Sudan.’ Sudan Contractors Association.  https://www.internationalhousingassociation.org/fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=3&contentID=266313&subContentID=721497&channelID=38488 (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pgs. 8-14.

Affordability

Poverty levels have worsened over time. Poverty increased in 2021 to 55.9%, partly due to COVID-19, but also other aggravating factors like conflict and climate change.[1] The Russia-Ukraine conflict is expected to make this worse. Many factors constrain housing affordability, including unemployment, default risk, economic performance, rising housing costs, and the inflation rate. The deterioration of economic activity due to COVID-19 slashed household incomes and purchasing power.[2] Many households extend their incomes by cutting back on food costs, depleting their savings, and relying on credit to survive.

Housing and land costs have increased over the years without a corresponding improvement in the employment rate or economic growth. In Khartoum, land prices averaged S£685 000/m2 ($1 500/m2) in 2018, which the Sudan Contractors Association considered exorbitant.[3] The problem is compounded by a high reliance on imported building materials and escalating inflation rates. The housing inflation rate was 17.7% in 2018.[4] Notably, most employees earn monthly salaries between S£10 042 ($22) and S£38 343 ($84).[5] According to the Sudan Contractors Association, it would take between 20-83 years for most employees to accumulate enough funds to construct a decent house if they saved at least 25% of their salaries.[6]

[1] African Development Bank (2022). Sudan Economic Outlook: Recent macroeconomic and financial developments. https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan/sudan-economic-outlook (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[2] World Bank (2021). The Impact of COVID-19 on Sudanese Households Reveals Growing Hardship, Social Despair. 12 May 2021. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/05/12/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-sudanese-households-reveals-growing-hardship-social-despair (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[3] Dongola, M. (2019). Presentation: ‘State of the Housing Industry – Sudan.’ Sudan Contractors Association.  https://www.internationalhousingassociation.org/fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=3&contentID=266313&subContentID=721497&channelID=38488 (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pgs. 8-14

[4]Ibid.). Pg. 5.

[5] Ibid.Pg. 12.

[6] Ibid.Pg. 12.

 

Housing Supply

Sudan has achieved significant milestones in housing but is yet to meet demand for housing. The overall housing supply deficit in 2018 was 2.5 million units.[1]  The National Fund for Housing and Reconstruction was established in 2008 to build decent houses, which can be repaid in flexible instalments, for vulnerable families in slums and informal settlements. The organisation was later split into two agencies.[2] The first arm focused on low-cost housing for the poor and slum dwellers, while the second agency produced investment housing or apartments for more affluent Sudanese. As of 2020, 1 461 investment units had been completed compared to 9 358 low-cost houses. Financial limitations coupled with high land and construction costs have hampered the organisation’s efforts, and 88% of Sudan’s urban population still resides in slums.[3]

Approximately 87% of the population reside in modest own-built houses. In urban areas, 67.39% own homes while 21.66% pay rent and 4.85% live in houses provided by employers.[4] The average monthly rent for a 150m² furnished two-bedroom apartment in Al-Taif, Khartoum, is S£250 627 ($549.06).[5] Most residential properties are constructed on land plots ranging from 300m²-500m². Government structures and policies on land allocation and title deeds are underdeveloped. Land ownership is primarily governed by a combination of civil and customary rules.[6] Bureaucratic processes also hinder the housing supply. Investors undertake at least 16 procedures over 255 days to obtain construction permits, costing 2.6% of the project.[7]

Most building materials are primarily imported, including cement, plaster, mica, steel, paint, wood products, asbestos, and stone.[8][9] Dependence on imported building materials exacerbates house price increases. Commodity prices have increased globally, while the Sudanese pound weakened against the US dollar. The official exchange rate of the Sudanese pound to the dollar weakened by 15% in March 2022 as a result of the Central Bank allowing the currency to float. The pound fell to S£530 to the dollar compared with S£448 previously.[10] [11] Ahmed et al in academic paper evaluated the impact of increasing commodity prices on public-funded housing projects using data from three contractors in Qadarif, Zalingei, and Khartoum. The basic contract price for a tonne of cement was S£2 150 in June 2017 in the Khartoum project but increased to S£3 600 by May 2018, while the price of reinforced concrete more than doubled from  S£14 000 to S£28 500 ($107-219) within the same period.[12]

The growing urban population comprising individuals from war-torn areas was considered a threat to Omar al-Bashir’s regime (1989-2019).[13] Strict property control and security measures were enacted to manage this population on the urban fringes, where plot sizes range between 200m² and 350m². These small plots were designed for fast and inexpensive connections to social amenities like water and electricity, but this was hindered by the inability to obtain legal property rights.

[1]Ibid.). Pgs. 8-14

[2] Franck, A. (2020). Three decades of social housing policies in Khartoum: Between violence, clientelism, and social consensus. Politique Africaine, 158, 149-174. https://www.cairn-int.info/journal–2020-2-page-149.htm (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 20.

[3] World Bank (2018). Population living in slums (% of urban population) – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS?locations=SD (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[4] Dongola, M. (2019). Presentation: ‘State of the Housing Industry – Sudan.’ Sudan Contractors Association.  https://www.internationalhousingassociation.org/fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=3&contentID=266313&subContentID=721497&channelID=38488 (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 7.

[5] Opensooq. (2022). Apartments for Rent in Khartoum. https://sd.opensooq.com/en/khartoum/real-estate-for-rent/apartments-for-rent (Accessed 23 August 2022).

[6] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Sudan. Social Institutions and Gender Index. https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/sudan/gender-6/1110-sudan-social-institutons-and-gender-index/file (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 5

[7] World Bank (2020). Economic Profile Sudan: Doing Business 2020. https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sudan/SDN.pdf (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 11.

[8] Computer and Enterprise Investigations Conference (2018). Sudan Imports: Manufactured Goods: Cement and Asbestos Pipes. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/sudan/imports-by-commodity/imports-manufactured-goods-cement-and-asbestos-pipes (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[9] Elkhalifa, A. (2016). The magnitude of barriers facing the development of the construction and building materials industries in developing countries, with special reference to Sudan in Africa. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.11.023 (Accessed 25 August 2022). Pgs. 189–198.

[10] Alamin, M. and Marks, S. (2022). Sudan Pound Weakens 15% as Central Bank Allows Currency to Float. 7 March 2022. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/sudan-s-central-bank-to-stop-intervening-on-exchange-rate (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[11] Central Bank of Sudan. (2022). Dollar exchange rate. https://cbos.gov.sd/en/dollar-exchange-rates?field_date_value%5Bmin%5D%5Bdate%5D=1-01-2022&field_date_value%5Bmax%5D%5Bdate%5D=25-08-2022 (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[12] Ahmed, Y.H., Sharafeldin, N. and Taber, E. (2021). Price Adjustments in the Sudanese Construction Industry for Public-funded projects. https://doi.org/10.52981/fjes.v9i3.691 (Accessed 12 September 2022) Pg. 23.

[13] Franck, A. (2020). Three decades of social housing policies in Khartoum: Between violence, clientelism, and social consensus. Politique Africaine, 158, 149-174. https://www.cairn-int.info/journal–2020-2-page-149.htm (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 20.

Property Markets

Sudan’s high-end real estate market has thrived. The number of gated communities has especially been rising, spurred by demand from a growing middle class that seeks secure, affordable, and fashionable housing. As of 2016, 14 gated communities featuring over 5 600 units were either complete or under construction in Khartoum.[1] Still, most Sudanese consider their rural homes their permanent address despite owning homes in urban areas. Limited access to financial services, a high poverty rate, and underdeveloped mortgage laws limit home ownership to inhabitants who can buy with cash or savings.

Poor digitisation and overreliance on a customary land tenure system have impeded housing progress. Most of Sudan’s land is unregistered and communally owned for farming.[2] Such lands are considered vacant or state-owned by default. Government denial and repossession of communal land ownership are major causes of conflict. Repressive customary practices restrain women from owning land unless through their male relatives.[3] Also, land registration is an expensive and protracted process. Individuals must pay 2.6% of the property value to register a property through six procedures over 11 days.[4]

Affordable housing for low and middle income earners is in greater demand than high-end villas. More than 50% of Sudan’s population can only afford houses made from nondurable materials, while middle income earners, who comprise at least 10% of the population, seek low-cost but durable houses.[5] These proportions represent millions of Sudanese, yet the National Fund for Housing and Reconstruction had completed less than 10 000 low-cost houses as of 2020.[6] Private developers have also had limited success in reducing the housing supply shortage.

Sudan is a highly patriarchal society where men dominate decision-making and access to goods, services, and property. Women are generally considered inferior and are deprived of education and economic resources. Prejudiced cultural practices inhibit women’s access to property.

[1] Elhadary, Y. and Ali, S. (2017). A New Trend in Urban Housing: Gated Communities in Khartoum, Sudan. American Journal of Sociological Research, 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314060546_A_New_Trend_in_Urban_Housing_Gated_Communities_in_Khartoum_Sudan (Accessed 25 August 2022). Pgs. 45–55.

[2] Amin, K. A. (2016). The State, Land, and Conflict in the Sudan. https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/sudan/conflict-6/1101-the-state-land-and-conflict-in-sudan/file (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 7.

[3] Land Portal. Land and Natural Resources Rights and Reforms in Sudan. https://www.landportal.org/news/2014/04/land-and-natural-resources-rights-and-reforms-sudan (Accessed 21 August 2022).

[4] World Bank (2020). Economic Profile Sudan: Doing Business 2020. https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sudan/SDN.pdf (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 4.

[5] Dongola, M. (2019). Presentation: ‘State of the Housing Industry – Sudan.’ Sudan Contractors Association.  https://www.internationalhousingassociation.org/fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=3&contentID=266313&subContentID=721497&channelID=38488 (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 14.

[6] Franck, A. (2020). Three decades of social housing policies in Khartoum: Between violence, clientelism, and social consensus. Politique Africaine, 158, 149-174. https://www.cairn-int.info/journal–2020-2-page-149.htm (Accessed 23 August 2022). Pg. 20.

Policy and Legislation

Sudan lacks a cohesive land tenure framework. Land ownership and registration are subject to discordant statutory and customary laws developed over time. The Land Resettlement and Registration Act of 1925 is still the primary legal framework dealing with land rights and land registration.[1] This law established government possession of all untenanted land alongside the procedures for land allocation, registration, leasing, resettlement, and titling. The law also outlined land allocation and utilisation arrangements and compensation mechanisms in urban areas. However, this law’s real-life applications mainly feature forceful confiscation of community lands.[2] Powerful individuals connected to the ruling regime often use this colonial law to possess large tracts of land. The Unregistered Lands Act of 1970 created confusion by bestowing all unlisted lands to the ruling regime, even though local communities use the properties.[3] As a result, various regimes have assigned plots for commercial development without consulting current owners. Infringements of communal land ownership rights have fuelled violent conflict.

The Local Government Act of 1998 improved land management through by establishing local committees that validate land ownership and registration.[4] These committees are still functional in Darfur and other urban areas, but political instability has impeded developing a secure land tenure system that would encourage housing investments. Area Land Committees also partner with the government and local communities to develop land use policies for various physical and social infrastructure. Slum upgrading projects and other housing schemes are facilitated by these committees, which spearhead mediation and consultation processes between landowners and investors. The Land Act prohibits foreign land tenure but recognises leaseholds of up to 99 years for investment reasons.[5]

Far-reaching land tenure reforms followed the Interim National Constitution of 2005, with customary land possession and traditional land regulations being acknowledged. Locals gained communal land use rights. If investors or communities need land for public use and development, claimants are compensated through cash or equivalent land. A Land Commission was also institutionalised to determine land issues. Developers can now access prime land for housing interventions, but complaints about non-existent or incomplete compensation often beleaguer major projects.[6]

Inadequate urban design and land tenure policy in the context of a rapidly increasing urban population have compounded the land management problem in the main urban areas. Poor use of the law exposes residents to aggressive evictions from areas earmarked for development and subsequent relocation to the fringes.[7]

For developers, acquiring land parcels from residents whose collective ownership rights are ambiguously itemised in legal frameworks is an ongoing challenge. Further, these land tracts are located in the peripheries where the city borders the desert. Other challenges entail illegal subdivisions of legally owned land through unofficial arrangements.[8] Powerful individuals often collude with government officials to acquire, subdivide, and develop unoccupied lands. The resulting housing developments occur without government approval and in violation of relevant laws.[9]

The government encourages housing interventions through policy and special programmes like the Khartoum Housing and Development Fund to provide low-cost houses, middle income apartments, and high-end villas.[10] Public-private partnerships involving banks, the Ministry of Planning and Public Utilities of Sudan, and the University of Khartoum have been forged to solicit resources for the project. However, the programme’s ultimate objective of delivering safe and affordable housing to inhabitants is hindered by insufficient funds, prohibitive policy, and bureaucratic state procedures.[11]

UN-Habitat has proposed an actionable urban strategy to enable Sudan to optimise its assets and opportunities, given the growing urban population.[12] However, urban development remains a low priority in Sudan, overshadowed by other pressing issues related to political instability, poverty, and declining agricultural production.

[1] Intergovernmental Authority on Development (2022). Sudan – Land Governance Country Profile. https://land.igad.int/index.php/countries/41-countries/sudan/42-sudan-profile?start=2 (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[2] Land Portal Foundation. Land and Natural Resources Rights and Reforms in Sudan. https://www.landportal.org/news/2014/04/land-and-natural-resources-rights-and-reforms-sudan

[3] Intergovernmental Authority on Development (2022). Sudan – Land Governance Country Profile. https://land.igad.int/index.php/countries/41-countries/sudan/42-sudan-profile?start=2 (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[4] Intergovernmental Authority on Development. (2022) Sudan – Land Governance Country Profile. https://land.igad.int/index.php/countries/41-countries/sudan/42-sudan-profile?start=2 (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[5] Taha, A. E. (2016). Land Use, Ownership and Allocation in Sudan – The challenge of corruption and lack of transparency. 16 September 2016. Sudan Transparency Initiative, https://democracyfirstgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/PDFs/Land-Use-Ownership-and-Allocation-in-Sudan.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[6] Gedaref, E. (2017). People displaced by Sudanese dam project complain of poverty, unemployment. 1 February 2017. Dabanga. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/people-displaced-by-sudanese-dam-project-complain-of-poverty-unemployment (Accessed 25 August 2022).

[7] Franck, A. and Waine, O. (2018). Land Insecurity in Khartoum: When Land Titles Fail to Protect Against Public Predation. https://metropolitics.org/Land-Insecurity-in-Khartoum-When-Land-Titles-Fail-to-Protect-Against-Public.html 6 June 2018. Metropolitics. (Accessed 26 August 2022). Pg. 2.

[8] USAID (2010). Land Tenure Issues in Southern Sudan: Key Findings and Recommendations for Southern Sudan Land Policy. December 2010. Land Links. https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/USAID_Land_Tenure_Southern_Sudan_Findings_and_Recommendations.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2022). Pg. 1.

[9] USAID (2010). Land Tenure Issues in Southern Sudan: Key Findings and Recommendations for Southern Sudan Land Policy. December 2010. Land Links. https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/USAID_Land_Tenure_Southern_Sudan_Findings_and_Recommendations.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2022). Pg. 1.

[10] UN-Habitat (2016). Sudanese Experience in the Provision of Sustainable Housing; an Innovative Funding Mechanism for Provision of Low-Cost Housing Targetting the Poor. 20 October 2016. https://habitat3.org/the-conference/programme/all/sudanese-experience-in-the-provision-of-sustainable-housing-an-innovative-funding-mechanism-for-provision-of-low-cost-housing-targetting-the-poor-2/ (Accessed 22 August 2022).

[11] Republic of Sudan (2017). The Council of Ministries – Prime Minister to accelerate the approval of the National Fund for Housing and Development Law. www.sudan.gov.sd/index.php/en/home/news_details/808 (Accessed 22 August 2022).

[12] UN-Habitat (2019). County Programme Document 2018-2021 – Sudan. https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019-05/country_programme_document_2018-2021_sudan.pdf (Accessed 22 August 2022). Pg. 18.

Opportunities

The country should prioritise urban planning to better manage its assets and systematise basic infrastructure as well as land acquisition, registration, and use. More deliberate efforts are necessary to align civil and customary land tenure systems. The conflict between traditional and legal land laws aggravates poverty, political instability, and the spread of informal settlements.

Incremental housing policy could alleviate the gap between housing demand and supply. Efforts by the Ministry of Planning and Infrastructure to meet the demand for housing alternatives via the Housing and Development Fund are well-intentioned but inadequate. The houses are meant for low and middle income earners and typically include a secure wall and a small house with a room, toilet, and kitchen. These houses are located on sizeable 150m²-350m² plots on urban fringes.[1] Beneficiaries are expected to improve their houses as income and family size increase. However, the fund has supplied too few units for the large Sudanese population needing houses. Greater funding should be directed to such housing mechanisms.

Digitisation of the land tenure system and banking services represents another vital opportunity. Increasing penetration of the internet and electricity in Sudan should correspond with a rise in digital banking. The number of Sudanese with access to the internet has increased, but partial digitisation of banking services continues to restrict access to housing finance. Technology optimisation will increase convenience and reduce costs.

A digitised land registration system would help individuals and investors access land records and conduct land searches. Land registry digitisation is also critical to enhancing transparency, efficiency, and accessibility of land records. The goal is to ensure appropriately defined property rights. Multi-sectoral collaboration between technology firms and the government will help Sudan achieve this objective. Research conducted by Iheanachor and Umukoro (2022) shows how partnerships in digital financial services often enable creation of a robust ecosystem based on mutual relationships that facilitate financial inclusion.[2]

Local manufacturing of building materials is another opportunity. Sudan’s inability to meet the housing demand is precipitated, in part, by an overreliance on expensive imported building materials.

Availability of Data on Housing Finance

There is a wealth of online housing finance data. The Central Bank of Sudan consistently publishes annual financial reports on money supply, economic developments, gross domestic product, and lending. These reports are publicly available online, but some are published in Arabic, which limits access. Other sources include the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Sudan Contractors Association. However, information is published sporadically. The Central Bureau of Statistics is archived. Overall, Sudanese institutions are yet to openly share housing finance data online. Independent entities like The World Bank and The African Development Bank help bridge the information gap.

Green Applications for Affordable Housing

Ongoing peace-building efforts and global economic restructuring in the aftermath of COVID-19 present Sudan with an opportunity to initiate and sustain a green economy. Sudan, however, seems unprepared to alter prevailing carbon-heavy growth strategies.

A Sustainable Building Council was launched in 2018 through collaboration between the ruling regime and the World Green Building Council.[1] However, the organisation does not have a website or active social media engagement to demonstrate its progress. EDGE certification is provided by Sintali-SGS, a globally recognised organisation for auditing and credentialing houses.[2] Evidence of EDGE-certified buildings could not be found.

Approximately 40% of Sudanese lack adequate access to clean and safe water, 67% lack proper access to basic sanitation, and 44.6% lack sufficient access to electricity.[3] Sudan relies primarily on non-renewable sources of electricity, particularly coal and oil.

[1] Gaafar, Z. (2018). Sudan’s First Sustainable Building Council Gets International Recognition. 15 July 2018. World Architecture Community. https://worldarchitecture.org/article-links/ehmcg/sudans_first_sustainable_building_council_gets_international_recognition.html (Accessed 22 August 2022).

[2] International Financial Corporation (2022). EDGE in Sudan. https://edgebuildings.psstudiosdev.com/certify/sudan/

[3] World Bank (2020). Access to electricity, rural (% of rural population) – Sudan. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.RU.ZS?locations=SD (Accessed 25 August 2022).

Websites

The Council of Ministries www.sudan.gov.sd/index.php/en/home/news_details/808

UN-Habitat https://unhabitat.org/sudan-housing-and-slum-upgrading

Making Finance Work for Africa https://www.mfw4a.org/country/sudan

The World Bank https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sudan

African Development Bank https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan

International Monetary Fund https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SDN

Land Links https://land-links.org/country-profile/sudan/

Central Bank of Sudan https://cbos.gov.sd/en/publication-type/annual-reports