Libya is in North Africa, bordered by Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad, North Sudan, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea. Its capital city is Tripoli; other major cities are Benghazi, Misrata and Bayda. The country has two types of climates: the Mediterranean climate along the coastal strip towards the sea and the desert climate of the Saharan desert in the interior region.⁵ The weather affects home construction, requiring suitable models and designs for the specific environment.

The total land area is 1 759 540 km2, with an estimated population of 6.89 million in 2023. The next census project was launched on 14 August 2023 and will take place in 2024.⁶ Population data is acquired through different estimations from various sources, so population information varies and is highly uncertain.

The population density in Libya is very low – 4 per km2 – with a population growth rate of 1.11%. This is attributed to natural population increase and negative net migration.⁷ Population increase puts pressure on housing and amenities. The housing shortage is exacerbated by a malfunctioning housing market and policy constraints that affect supply and demand. The demand for housing is suppressed by a lack of access to finance in the mortgage market and the absence of long-term investment in accessible mortgage loans.

Approximately 82% of the population is urban. Unfortunately, data representing the current slum population is unavailable. Approximately 6% of the total population in 2015 lived less than 5m above sea level, making them vulnerable to disaster risks and related hazards.⁸ The catastrophic floods further resulted in devastating loss of lives and property, underscoring the country’s weakness in disaster risk management.⁹ The prevalence of informal settlements is also a repercussion of the country’s unstable security situation. Makeshift housing, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, are also a consequence of the conflict. Displaced individuals and families live in precarious conditions, lacking access to essential services, and facing ongoing insecurity.¹⁰

The country’s real gross domestic product (GDP) is LD24.59 billion (US$50.49 billion),¹¹ with a forecasted growth rate of 4.8% for 2024, following a growth rate of -1.7% in 2023.¹² The oil sector remains the country’s primary source of income and foreign exchange. Energy exports constitute 96% of the country’s total exports and contribute approximately 95% to the state budget, highlighting the sector’s vital importance to the nation’s economy.¹³ Inflation is forecast to remain subdued, at around 2.8% in 2024 and 2.6% in 2025,reflecting expected stability in global food prices.¹⁴ Libya’s political and security conditions are volatile and heavily reliant on the oil and gas sector, making them susceptible to climate change; and increased insecurity could result in an oil blockade and hinder GDP growth.

In addition, COVID-19 exacerbated health and social challenges, disrupted trade and tourism, increased fiscal pressures, and caused a decline in global oil prices. The decline in global oil prices led to reduced government revenues, increased budgetary deficits, and depleted foreign reserves. Correspondingly, the Libyan dinar depreciated and import costs increased. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also notably increased the risk of further instability and violence in the country. In 2020, Libya was ranked as the tenth leading importer of wheat from Ukraine. This caused the country to consider more expensive imports from other sources.¹⁵ On the other hand, Libya benefited from skyrocketing global oil prices which increased financial revenue and the inflow of hard currency.¹⁶

Libya remains a fragile state trapped in political uncertainty. Decades of socialist policies during the Muammar Gaddafi era, followed by civil war and political infighting, stifled financial sector development, impaired credit intermediation, and contributed to low private sector participation in the economy.¹⁷ Episodes of active conflict have become less frequent, but the country remains de facto divided between the West and the East and fragmented among various militias with competing objectives.¹⁸ The government is unable to effectively address and deal with the lack of proper documentation of property rights and legal disputes over land ownership. As a result, many Libyans struggle to find suitable housing.

Libya’s financial system is complex and fragmented. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) regulates and supervises the banking system. There are 21 commercial banks with a total asset value of approximately LD143 billion (US$29.4 billion).¹⁹ The CBL owns two of the four largest banks: Al Jumhuriya, National Commercial Bank, Al Wahda, and Sahara.²⁰ However, the sector is under-capitalised; with a capitalisation of LD4 billion (US$821 million), LD112 billion (US$23 billion) in assets, and LD86 billion (US$17.6 billion) in deposits. The CBL has attempted to modernise the banking system. Nevertheless, it still faces various challenges such as: a lack of independence, the division between the region’s branches, a lack of human and technical resources, and limited enforcement capacity.²¹ The current financial situation affects housing in many ways, including a lack of security and financing.

Women do not need permission from a male family member to access credit or purchase property. However, other social or cultural rights may deter them from exercising their economic rights. The number of banked women is not readily available due to a lack of reliable and disaggregated data on financial inclusion.²² However, it is estimated that women are less likely than men to access traditional financial services.²³ The crisis in Libya and the recent pandemic have had negative impacts, especially on the lives of women and girls.

The financial sector provides various financial services, such as money exchange, remittances, lending, and saving.²⁴ Sources of housing finance available are commercial banks, the Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB), the Social Security Fund, and the informal sector. Commercial banks offer mortgages based on conventional interest rates or Islamic finance principles with an average interest rate of 6%.²⁵ However, this rate does not reflect the actual cost of borrowing as there may be other factors depending on the bank’s discretion, market conditions, demand and supply. The current value of outstanding residential mortgages is LD2.59 billion (US$532.3 million).²⁶

The non-banking system in Libya is underdeveloped, with minimal contribution to the economy. It is characterised by a rudimentary capital market with a few nonbank financial institutions, such as insurance companies, leasing companies, microfinance institutions, money transfer operators, and a large informal financial sector.

Libya has two microfinance companies. Namaa Tamweel provides loans for lowincome households to purchase or construct houses. Al Tadhamun provides microfinance to entrepreneurs in Libya by supporting them to set up their businesses, and non-financial services such as business development or administrative support. Credit bureaus exist in Libya, but financial institutions do not widely use them. Libya has a public credit registry that covers about 0.6% of the adult population. Libya has a depth of credit information index of 0 out of 8.

This means that the credit registry and the credit bureau do not collect or distribute enough information to inform lending decisions.²⁸

An interview with a partner from Tripoli Properties highlighted several key issues in Libya’s housing finance sector.²⁹ While the country remains financially united, with the CBL in the West managing monetary policy, administrative governance is split. This division complicates urban planning and housing development, as the East spends money from the West without cohesive national strategies. Additionally, issues with currency circulation have arisen with different currencies printed in the UK in use. The banks are addressing this problem by requesting citizens to exchange these outdated currencies (Russian printed) for acceptable ones. In the absence of substantial government support and limited bank financing, private individuals have largely taken on the responsibility of housing development. Libyans are permitted to build their own homes using their own plans and contractors. This self-directed approach to housing is common.

Libya suffers from a severe housing shortage, particularly in urban areas where housing programmes are dominated mainly by public social rental housing.³⁰ Libya faces: inadequate urban planning and management; weak governance and institutional capacity; lack of essential services and infrastructure; environmental degradation; vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change; and social exclusion and inequality.

The unemployment rate in Libya increased to 20.7% in 2022, up from 19.6% in 2019, with the unemployment rate for women higher than that for men in 2022.^{31, 32} Estimates vary, but approximately a third of people in Libya were said to be living in poverty in 2018.³³ The Gini coefficient was 55.9 in 2019.³⁴ Approximately 88% of the migrant workforce in Libya is engaged in informal work such as construction, agriculture, or domestic work. Moreover, approximately 20% of this population was unemployed as of 2021.³⁵ This means that many migrants struggle to find regular work opportunities to meet their basic needs.

Typically, land pricing and monthly rentals in urban areas vary depending on their location, size, demand, and quality. According to Tripoli Properties, a private real estate property company dealing with rental housing, a one-bedroomed 80m2 – 100m2 unit in Zawiyat Dahmani is LD1 900 – LD3 000 (US$390 – US$616) a month; and a four-bedroomed unit in the same location measuring 150m2 – 250m2 is LD4 000 – LD6 000 (US$821 – US$1 232).³⁶ These prices reflect changes from the previous year,  influenced by fluctuations in the exchange rate (particularly the gold market rate), political stability, and rising living costs (inflation). Given that many Libyans live below the national poverty line, these rental rates are likely unaffordable for the majority. In 2022, Libya’s average monthly income per capita was LD7 260 (US$1 505).³⁷

Household expenditure on basic services such as water and electricity vary. It depends on the availability, quality, and consumption patterns per household. The inflation rate for these services in the second quarter of 2022 increased to 8.5%, from 6% earlier the same year.³⁸ As a result, households have needed to resort to alternative sources that may not incur an additional charge. However, measuring household credit indebtedness and its impacts on housing affordability, based on household consumption and expenditure, is challenging, and data is unreliable.

In the urban areas of Libya, housing is typically categorised into four types: public social rental, private formal, private informal, and traditional. Public social rental housing has been provided by the government since the 1970s and is located on the outskirts of cities. This housing is often of poor quality, design, and maintenance. Private formal housing is developed by the private sector and is in well-serviced areas near or within city centres. Private informal housing is developed by individuals or groups with official permits and is in peri-urban areas or slums. These dwellings are often affordable but lack quality and security. Traditional housing is the oldest form of housing, dating to the pre-colonial era. These units were built with local materials and techniques, owned by indigenous households which have strong ties to their land and community.

Several challenges constrain housing supply, such as land tenure issues, lack of access to finance, a weak regulatory framework, corruption, and security risks. The public sector has been the leading housing provider, but the country’s political and economic crisis has affected its capacity and resources. The private sector is affected by the lack of a functioning mortgage system and the high cost of construction materials and labour.³⁹

Land tenure in Libya is governed by a mix of customary and statutory laws. The country’s land policies have had several changes including nationalisation, redistribution, and privatisation of land. Currently, the land administration system involves multiple institutions issuing and registering titles. It is estimated that about 30% of the urban population has formal titles to their land, while most of the rural population relies on customary or informal tenure arrangements that are unrecognised by the state.⁴⁰

Land ownership is influenced by political and tribal affiliations that are often gender specific. Title deeds are issued in women’s names; however, they still face legal and cultural barriers to accessing land.⁴¹ The country lacks an updated land registry, digitised land tenure and title system. Most land records exist in paper form and are stored in different offices across the country. Most of these records have been damaged or lost due to conflict, corruption, and poor management. Registering residential property involves multiple procedures and needs several days to complete.⁴²

Rental and house prices have increased significantly over the years due to inflation, currency devaluation and supply  shortages. Social housing is in high demand. It is subsidised by the government but is scarce. Libya’s property market is insecure and informal, and the residential resale market is limited and opaque.

Property rate payments are regulated by Law No. 11 of 2010 on local administration that confers power to the municipal councils  to determine the value and rate of property tax, collect tax from property owners or occupiers, and issue receipts and certificates of payment.⁴³ It also stipulates that property taxes should not exceed 3% of the property’s annual rental value. The number of properties registered for property rate payments is unclear. The property tax system is weak and ineffective due to the lack of a comprehensive and updated property registry on ownership, occupancy, and value of each property. A variety of weak practices and poor data management limit the effectiveness of this process.

Libyan housing policies have evolved over the past decades, with advantages and disadvantages in the development of the housing sector. The government provided land for construction to encourage private sector participation in real estate. ⁴⁴ Libya’s housing sector is still heavily influenced by laws enacted during the Gaddafi regime. One significant challenge is Law No. 4 of 1978,⁴⁵ which allowed tenants to claim ownership of rented properties during the late 1970s without continuing to pay rent. This law, which remains in effect today, creates significant legal complexities around property ownership. Potential buyers must navigate the risk of purchasing properties from those who may have acquired them under this law rather than from the original owners, leading to inflated prices and legal uncertainties.⁴⁶

The absence of a formal government organisation has made the country’s housing delivery ineffective. The government has not created an enabling environment for private sector provision of housing, leading to a chronic deficit. The existing policies and laws are outdated and inadequate to address the current needs. There are no new policies or legislations addressing housing challenges or opportunities, nor any supporting green building. The legal framework is complex, unclear, and undermines land security and people’s property rights.

The devastating floods of 2023 have underscored the urgent need for resilient housing solutions. This presents a significant opportunity to plan and map out housing developments that can withstand future natural disasters. By incorporating flood-resistant designs and materials, and identifying safe zones for new constructions, Libya can enhance the safety and stability of its housing infrastructure.

There is a significant opportunity to digitise the land registry system in Libya. Implementing a digital land management system could streamline property transactions, improve transparency, and reduce legal disputes over  ownership. Learning from successful implementations in other countries could help convince the government of the benefits and feasibility of this approach.

There is a crucial opportunity to revisit and complete previously stalled housing projects. Renegotiating existing contracts with contractors and stakeholders can pave the way for resuming construction activities. This can be achieved by addressing any financial, logistical, or legal obstacles that have hindered progress. Completing these housing projects will not only provide much-needed homes for Libyan citizens but also stimulate the construction sector, creating jobs and driving economic growth.

Another opportunity lies in the development of smaller, more affordable housing units. While currently, only individual developers are undertaking such projects, there is potential for formal developers to enter this market. By buying land and constructing smaller buildings, developers can still achieve profitable margins while addressing the growing demand for affordable housing in urban and suburban areas.

Libya’s extended war has severely hampered its statistical abilities rendering critical information inaccessible. The main organisation that collects and shares data (publicly on websites) on housing finance in Libya is the Central Bank of Libya through annual reports, economic bulletins, monetary and banking statistics, and the balance of payments. The Bureau of Census and Statistics, the Housing and Infrastructure Board, land registries, real estate and savings development banks, and the Ministries of Finance, Economy, Commerce, Industry and Planning also provide data.

It is not easy to obtain data on housing finance as the mortgage market is underdeveloped and reliable data is lacking due to a variety of political stability challenges. Vital indicators such as the loan-to-value ratio, mortgage rates, disaggregated data by gender, and climate-related innovations remain largely absent from official records. The political division between the General National Congress and the House of Representatives, and the security instability in the country have resulted in a lack of a stable legal and regulatory framework. Reliable international sources include the UN, International Finance Corporation, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and African Development Bank (AfDB).

Central Bank of Libya:
https://cbl.gov.ly/en/

Department of Statistics and Census:
https://bsc.ly/

Tadhamon Bank:
https://tab.ly/

PakLibya:
https://paklibya.com.pk/

Libya Herald:
https://libyaherald.com/

Tripoli Properties:
https://www.tripolipropertiesonline.com/

1. Al Jazeera English (Director). Rebuilding Libya: Housing sector struggles to recover after war [Video recording]. 5 August 2023.
2. Ibid.
3. World Bank Libya Storm and Flooding 2023: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (English).Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 25 January 2024. Pgs. 62-72.
4. Relief Web. Libya: Flash Appeal Flood Response, September 2023. 15 September 2023.
5. Climates to Travel (2023). Libya climate: Average weather, temperature, rainfall, sunshine.
6. General Information Authority – State of Libya (2023). Launching the seventh general population census project and other accompanying censuses in Libya. 14 August 2023.
7. Macro Trends (n.d.). Libya Net Migration Rate 1950-2024. https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/
   countries/LBY/libya/net-migration (Accessed 28 July 2024).
8. World Bank (2023).World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/country/libya (Accessed 31 August 2023).
9. Olorenshaw,A.,Ali, F., Symons, H. and Swann, G. (2023). Destruction of Derna: Why was flooding so bad in Libyan port city? The Guardian. 14 September 2023.
10. International Organization for Migration (2020).A Long Way from Home – Migrants housing conditions in Libya. November 2020. Pg. 8. 1 World Bank World Development Indicators | DataBank. 1 Mohamed, H. (2024).World Bank Expects 4.8% Growth in Libyan Economy for 2024. Libya Review. 16 April 2024.
11.  
12.  
13. Ibid.
14. African Development Bank (2024).African Economic Outlook 2024. Pg. 230.
15. Ramani, S. (2022). How has the Ukraine war affected Russia’s ties with Libya and Sudan? Middle East Institute. (25 April 2022.)
16. World Bank (2022). Libya Economic Monitor – September 2022. Pg. 21.
17. Libya: 2024 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Libya. (n.d.). IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/07/11/Libya-2024-Article-IVConsultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-551681 (Accessed 24 July 2024). Pg. 2.
18. Ibid.
19. Ghawi, S. and Rupavatharam,V. (2023). Libya Selected Issues Paper. International Monetary Fund. Pg. 2.
20. Central Bank of Libya (2023). Commercial Banks. https://cbl.gov.ly/en/commercial-banks/ (Accessed 31 August 2023).
21. World Bank (2020). Libya Financial Sector Review. Libya Financial Sector Review English Final.docx (worldbank.org) (Accessed 31 August 2023). Pg. 14.
22. UN Women (2023).Arab States – Libya. https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/countries/libya (Accessed 31 August 2023).
23. Burchfield, E. (2019). How the exclusion of women has cost Libya. Atlantic Council. 26 November 2019. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-the-exclusion-of-women-has-costlibya/ (Accessed 31 August 2023).
24. International Monetary Fund (2023) Libya: Selected Issues. IMF Country Reports 23/202. Pg. 9.
25. African Development Bank (2022). Promoting affordable housing in African Cities. AfDB Sustainable Urban Development Action Plan (SUDAP). Pg. 20.
26. Central Bank of Libya (2024). 2024 Q1 Quarter Economic Bulletin.
27. Tadhamon Bank (2023). Leadership in digital banking. https://tab.ly/ (Accessed 31 August 2023).
28. Zaptia, S. (2022). Lack of credit bureau, property registry and urban planning a hindrance to Libyan banks issuing more loans. 10 November 2022. Libya Herald.
29. Virtual Interview with Tarek Benrewin, Tripoli Properties, 6 August 2024,Tripoli, Libya.
30. Omran, A. (2018). Housing Policies and Strategies in Libya: Brief an Overview. Article. February 2018. Pg. 4.
31. Take-Profit (2023). Libya Unemployment Rate and Employment Data.Take-profit.org.
32. Trading Economics (2023). Libya Unemployment Rate–2023. Data–2024  Forecast–1991-2022.
33. Kennedy, S. (2018).Top 10 Facts about Poverty in Libya -The Borgen Project. 18 August 2018.
34. World Economics (2023). Libya’s Gini Coefficient. https://www.worldeconomics.com/Inequality/GiniCoefficient/Libya.aspx (Accessed 31 August 2023).
35. Relief Web (2021). Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Libya’s Migrant Report: Round 37. May-June 2021 [EN/AR]. Pg. 4.
36. Email correspondence with Jeff Wilson, Tripoli Properties, 23 July 2024.
37. Statista (2023). Libya: Income per capita.
38. Central Bank of Libya (2022) 2022 Q2 Quarter Economic Bulletin. Pg. 33.
39. Rahman,A. and Di Maio, M. (2020).The Private Sector amid Conflict: The Case of Libya. Washington, DC: World Bank.
40. LandLinks (2023). Libya Country Profile. https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/libya/ (Accessed 20 September 2023).
41. Ansell, M.O. and A-Arif, I.M. (2023).The Libyan Civil Code.An English translation and a comparison with the Egyptian Civil code. Pg. 17.
42. World Bank (2020). Doing Business. Archive. https://archive.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies (Accessed 30 July 2024) Pg.4.
43. Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (2023). DCAF in Libya. Legal Database for the Security Sector in Libya. https://security-legislation.ly/ (Accessed 31 August 2023).
44. Shawesh, E.M. (2016). Libyan Policy in the Field of Public Housing.
    https://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://www.ijrsset.org/pdfs/v3-i10/2.pdf (Accessed 31 August 2023). Pg. 1.
45. UN Habitat (2023). Land administration and land rights for peace and development in Libya: Analysis and recommendations. Pg, 15.
46. See footnote 28.
47. Karmod. Karmod is to establish a big social housing project in Libya. 19 July 2023. https://www.karmod.eu/allnews/affordable-housing-libya/ (Accessed 16 August 2024).
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